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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in accordance with resolution 1036 (1996) of 12 January 1996, by which the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) for an additional period terminating on 12 July 1996, subject to a review by the Council of the mandate of UNOMIG in the event of any changes that may be made in the mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-keeping force. By the same resolution, the Council requested me to continue to keep it regularly informed and to report after three months from the date of the adoption of the resolution on all aspects of the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, including the operations of UNOMIG. Pursuant to that resolution, I reported to the Council on 15 April 1996 (S/1996/284). The present report provides a further update of the situation as of 24 June 1996 and contains my recommendations regarding the future of UNOMIG.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. The Georgian and Abkhaz sides have reaffirmed their desire for a political solution and their determination to continue the negotiation process. Both also support an active United Nations role in this regard. During the reporting period, several direct contacts between representatives of the two sides took place. But the Georgian/Abkhaz peace process is stalled, because the key issue, the future political status of Abkhazia, remains unresolved (see S/1996/284, para. 2).

3. The primary responsibility for helping the two sides to resolve the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict rests with the United Nations. I had the opportunity to discuss the question with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Mr. Irakli Menagarashivili, in New York on 3 May 1996. My Special Envoy, Ambassador Edouard Brunner, and his resident Deputy, Mr. Liviu Bota, maintained close contact with the President of Georgia, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, and with the Abkhaz leader, Mr. Vladislav Ardzinba, with their representatives in Moscow and with other political figures on the two sides.

4. During the reporting period, the Russian Federation, in its capacity as facilitator, continued to lead efforts to persuade the parties to accept the draft protocol referred to in paragraph 40 of my report dated 2 January 1996 (S/1996/5) and thus establish basic principles on which a more detailed agreement could be elaborated. During my visit to Moscow from 14 to 18 May 1996, I met with President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, with whom I discussed their efforts in this regard. My Special Envoy and his Deputy also conferred regularly with the representatives of the Russian Federation on how to bring the two sides closer to compromise solutions. Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to persuade the two sides to accept the draft protocol proposed by the Russian Federation.

5. My Special Envoy and his Deputy also maintained regular contact with senior representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

6. During the month of May, the Ambassadors of the group of "Friends of Georgia" in Tbilisi, which includes France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, met with President Shevardnadze and, a few days later, Mr. Ardzinba, to deliver a démarche in which they conveyed their concern, inter alia, at the lack of progress towards a political settlement in Abkhazia. They reiterated their belief that the international community could help the parties resolve their differences only if the parties themselves were willing to do so. They also stated that the safe and dignified return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes in Abkhazia, with sufficient guarantees for safety of all individuals, including those belonging to ethnic minorities, must be a humanitarian priority.

7. President Shevardnadze responded to the démarche by indicating that the Government of Georgia was interested in implementing all resolutions and presidential statements of the Security Council. The President expressed his readiness to establish contact with the Abkhaz leadership in order to seek a reduction of the level of criminality and violence in the Gali region which would facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons. It was important, he said, that the "Friends of Georgia" were making the démarche in the presence of the Special Envoy's Deputy. Mr. Ardzinba expressed dissatisfaction with the resolutions of the Security Council, which in his view were not based on the factual reports of the Secretary-General. He asserted that no "ethnic cleansing" had been committed by the Abkhaz. He insisted that no large-scale repatriation of refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia was possible, even if he so permitted, because the local population would not accept them. Time was needed to heal wounds and to change outlooks. Also, such a return required substantive progress towards a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict. He emphasized that Abkhazia would only establish relations with Georgia as a "federative union".

8. There have been a number of other significant developments in the region that directly or indirectly affect the Georgian/Abkhaz peace process.

9. On 17 April 1996, the Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution entitled "On measures for settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia", in which it decided, inter alia, to instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia to confirm

that the Supreme Council and Council of Ministers of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic in Tbilisi were the sole legitimate organs of state power and administration and expressed the interests of the population of Abkhazia. The resolution recommended, inter alia, that Abkhazia be given far-reaching autonomy within the framework of a unified Georgian State, including its own constitution, parliament, higher executive and judiciary bodies, anthem, flag, coat of arms and other state attributes, as well as its own jurisdiction in economic, social, financial and tax questions.

10. The Abkhaz leader, Mr. Ardzinba, characterized this resolution as an attempt to disrupt the peace process, as in his view it contradicted the essence of the agreements already signed within the framework of that process.

11. The Council of Heads of State of CIS met in Moscow on 17 May 1996 and adopted a decision on the presence of the collective peace-keeping forces in the conflict zone in Abkhazia, Georgia (see S/1996/371, annex I), by which it, inter alia, decided to call upon the parties to the conflict to accelerate the negotiation process with a view to ensuring a political settlement with the Russian Federation acting as facilitator.

12. A memorandum on measures for establishing security and strengthening mutual confidence among the parties to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was signed in Moscow on 16 May 1996 by the representatives of the Georgian and South-Ossetian sides, as well as by the representatives of the Russian Federation, OSCE and the representatives of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, acting as mediators. In substance, the memorandum establishes important confidence-building measures such as the speeding up of the return of refugees and displaced persons, the establishment of a demilitarized zone and the holding of bilateral meetings on a number of issues.

13. On 3 June 1996, the Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Russian Federation met at Kislovodsk, Russian Federation, and adopted a declaration entitled "For Inter-ethnic Accord, Peace, and Economic and Cultural Cooperation in the Caucasus" (see A/51/162-S/1996/425, annex), by which the signatories, inter alia, declared their firm resolve to promote lasting peace and stability in the Caucasus. The leaders of the North Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation also participated in the Kislovodsk meeting.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

14. United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to implement multisectoral humanitarian assistance programmes throughout Abkhazia. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has carried out vaccination and immunization programmes, and the World Food Programme (WFP) continued to address the food situation in the region.

15. On 31 May 1996, the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for the Caucasus, covering the period June 1996 through May 1997, was launched. The appeal, which addresses the immediate needs of internally displaced persons, as

well as other vulnerable groups in the community, seeks US $37 million for Georgia.

A. Situation of refugees and displaced persons

16. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in close cooperation with non-governmental organizations, initiated, during the reporting period, three major projects in the Gali region to support the reintegration of those persons who have returned to their place of residence. The first project consists of the rehabilitation of 23 schools in the security zone, including the supply of school furniture. The second project supports the Gali hospital by providing medical equipment. The third project is intended to increase the corn harvest by distributing seeds, fertilizer and diesel oil.

B. Human rights

17. As I informed the Council in my previous report, the interested parties have agreed to a programme for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia (see S/1996/264, annex I). This is to be carried out by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in cooperation with OSCE. At present, consultations are under way between the High Commissioner and OSCE regarding the implementation of the programme and the establishment of an office in Sukhumi. The High Commissioner is planning to deploy one or two experienced United Nations staff members to the office, which would be located at UNOMIG premises in Sukhumi. UNOMIG would also provide the necessary logistical support. OSCE is ready to deploy one human rights officer to the office and to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the programme.

18. Despite the efforts of the High Commissioner during the last few months, it has not proved possible to mobilize the necessary funds on a voluntary basis. Bearing in mind the importance attached by the Security Council, in the context of the mandate of UNOMIG, to the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia, e.g. in paragraphs 7 and 10 of resolution 1036 (1996), it is my intention, subject to the concurrence of the competent legislative bodies, to include the small costs of this human rights programme in the budget of UNOMIG. On this basis, the human rights office would report to the High Commissioner for Human Rights through the Head of Mission of UNOMIG.

IV. OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA

19. During the period covered by the present report, UNOMIG continued to operate in parts of the security and restricted weapons zones and in the Kodori valley (see attached map). Because of the continued threat posed by the indiscriminate mining of roads on the north side of the Inguri river, the Mission remained unable to operate in that area (see paras. 35-40 below). As a result, the deployment of the Mission and its concept of operations had to be changed temporarily. Three of the team bases in the Gali sector - at Otobaya, Inguri-Ges and Zemo-Bargevi - have been closed, and only the base in the town of Gali remains open. At this time, UNOMIG observers patrol Gali town and the main

road (known as the M-27) crossing the sector. Some of the observers have been reassigned to other sectors within the Mission's area of responsibility. In all other respects, the Mission's deployment remains as described in my report of 15 April 1996 (S/1996/284).

20. The Mission continues to operate at its full authorized strength of 136 military observers drawn from 23 countries (see annex). Because of the effects of the mine problem on the Mission's activities and pending the arrival of the engineering equipment and personnel to deal with the mine threat (see para. 38 below), the normal rotation of the observers will be delayed slightly in the coming months.

21. The withdrawal of the team bases from the Gali sector has had a number of repercussions, the most serious of which has been that the Mission is now deprived of a source of reliable information and is incapable of verifying most of the incidents that take place in that sector. The Gali sector headquarters depends on the CIS peace-keeping force, the Abkhaz militia and the civilian administration for information about the situation in Gali. While it maintains good relations with these groups, information received from them is not always timely or fully reliable. It also has to be reported that a sense of insecurity and disillusionment has developed in the population of the nearby villages in the wake of the withdrawal of the Gali team bases. On the other hand, the transfer of observers from the Gali sector to the Zugdidi sector enables the Mission to cover additional unofficial crossing points over the Inguri river and to gain information from the local population about the situation on the west side of the river.

22. On 16 April, UNOMIG reopened the team base at Adjara in the Kodori valley, which had been closed during the winter months. Since then, patrols have been well-received by the local population. Because of the time required to reach the valley, these patrols operate for periods of between two to four days at a time.

23. The scheduled weekly meetings, chaired by the Chief Military Observer of UNOMIG, between the Chief of the Zugdidi police and the Head of the Gali militia (see S/1996/284, para. 29) have led to an increased willingness by both sides jointly to fight criminality. Similarly, the weekly quadripartite meetings, chaired by the Force Commander of the CIS peace-keeping force, between the Chief Military Observer and the heads of the Zugdidi and Gali administrations (ibid., para. 30), have served to build confidence and permit discussions on common problems of security and exchange of hostages, as well as on humanitarian issues.

24. UNOMIG has continued to cooperate with UNHCR and ICRC and other non-governmental organizations. Regular meetings with these organizations facilitate the exchange of information regarding both the security situation in the area of operation and the Mission's activities. In addition, UNOMIG continues to forward to relevant organizations information on cases that require these organizations' assistance and provides them with support as necessary. UNOMIG medical teams have continued to provide their services to the local population throughout the Mission area, including the town of Gali.

25. The aircraft made available by the Government of Switzerland (S/1996/284, para. 27) is now operational and is being used to transport observers, civilian staff and cargo to and from the Mission area.

V. SITUATION ON THE GROUND

A. General

26. The situation has remained unsettled in the Gali sector and generally calm in the Zugdidi sector. In the former, UNOMIG is still reporting lawlessness, including acts of murder, armed robbery, looting, extortion and intimidation, which are clearly not conducive to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The Abkhaz militia has little control over this region, and the lack of visible authority and effective policing enables various criminal groups to operate with a large measure of impunity. This general lack of security is reported to have led to the establishment of unofficial "self-defence groups" in some villages. Because of its present inability to patrol the Gali sector, UNOMIG does not have detailed knowledge about these groups, but it is making every effort to obtain additional information.

27. None of the UNOMIG military observers was a victim of violent crime during the reporting period. However, it is the Chief Military Observer's assessment that this is due more to the reduced level of patrolling in the Gali sector than to a general improvement in security.

B. Security and restricted weapons zones

28. The security and restricted weapons zones on each side of the Inguri river continue to be affected by different sets of problems. In the Gali sector, violent crime remains the principal issue of concern, while in the Zugdidi sector the main problem has been the continuing plight of internally displaced persons in the six main camps and in local villages. While many hundreds of internally displaced persons cross the Inguri river during the day in order to tend their fields or maintain their houses on the other bank, they generally return to the comparative security of the Georgian side at night.

29. Members of the Council will recall that, at the time of my last report, UNOMIG was involved in protracted negotiations for the exchange of hostages (see S/1996/284, para. 33). On 8 April, the Abkhaz side exchanged 28 hostages and 4 corpses for 2 soldiers held by the Georgian side. A second exchange on 26 April involved five Georgian fishermen arrested for straying into Abkhaz "territorial waters", who were exchanged in return for five Abkhaz citizens who had been taken in retaliation.

30. During the reporting period, both sides violated the Moscow agreement of 14 May 1994. There were 5 violations by the Abkhaz side and 42 by the Georgian side. The majority of the Georgian violations were committed by off-duty and unarmed soldiers who entered the security zone for private purposes. In all but two cases, these violations were protested on the spot.

31. On 30 May, an Abkhaz vehicle carrying two civilians and two militiamen was ambushed by unknown individuals in the security zone of the Gali sector and its four occupants killed. The vehicle was discovered by the CIS peace-keeping force. Following that incident, the Abkhaz authorities issued a press statement condemning the act as the result of "terrorist activity by bandit groups sent from Georgia, whose target is to sabotage the negotiations, destabilize the situation and secure the provision of police functions to the peace-keeping force".

32. On 2 June, 25 specially trained Abkhaz militiamen were brought into the Gali sector to conduct an operation aimed at countering the increase in the level of insurgent activities in the area. It was the assessment of the Mission that the operation was conducted in an orderly and restrained manner. The CIS peace-keeping force followed the situation closely and provided UNOMIG with regular information.

C. Kodori valley

33. The situation in the Kodori valley is unsettled, and there is sporadic violence. The reopening of the Adjara team base went smoothly and UNOMIG patrols have since been allowed complete access into the eastern end of the valley.

34. Because of the continuing lawlessness in the valley, the local population has taken matters into its own hands and is "policing" the area. A two-tiered council of village leaders has been established. The council has given itself judicial power and the upper council can reportedly even impose the death penalty.

D. The mine problem

35. Since I last reported to the Security Council, there have been seven mine-related incidents, one of which killed a local civilian and injured two others. None of these incidents involved UNOMIG directly. On 10 April, however, an anti-tank mine reinforced with anti-personnel mines was found on a road used mainly by the Mission and only occasionally by the local population. Because of the Mission's lack of demining capacity, this incident prompted the Chief Military Observer to recommend the closure of the three team bases in the Gali sector (see para. 19 above).

36. As already reported (see S/1996/284, para. 25) it has been the practice of UNOMIG to patrol the main roads in the security zone only when the CIS peace-keeping force declares them to be clear. However, the force's demining activities are limited to the roads linking its sector headquarters to specific check-points, and its own demining does not therefore provide UNOMIG observers with sufficient security to resume their own patrolling at an effective level.

37. As I indicated in my last report (see S/1996/284, para. 25), the Head of Mission has discussed with the Government of Georgia and with the Abkhaz authorities how they could help enhance the Mission's safety. Although both

sides have expressed concern about the observers' security, it is clear, for the reasons I stated, that neither has the capacity to assist the Mission substantially. As the Council is aware, the Head of Mission has also had meetings with the relevant authorities in Moscow to see whether the assistance of the CIS peace-keeping force could be enlisted to improve the security of UNOMIG personnel in the area where that force is deployed. These authorities have expressed willingness to assist UNOMIG provided that their services are paid for by the United Nations. Bearing in mind the requirement that a commercially contracted mine-clearing unit should be under the command and control of the Head of Mission and in view of the nature of the mandate of UNOMIG, it was decided to pursue other arrangements.

38. A team of demining experts from the Secretariat visited the area between 23 April and 8 May to train the observers in mine awareness and the use of mine-detection equipment. On the basis of the team's recommendations and in light of the Head of Mission's discussions, it has now been decided to provide the Mission with both mine-protected vehicles and some engineering support. It is anticipated that the engineers, whose task will be to undertake daily road clearing, will be accommodated within the authorized strength of the Mission and that they will be deployed with their own mine-detection vehicles and related equipment. A concept of operations can be finalized only when it has been agreed which Government will contribute the engineering support and mine-detection equipment. This arrangement, when fully operative, should enable UNOMIG to resume patrolling the Gali sector at almost the same level of operational effectiveness as previously and should remain in effect for the long term. However, I do not wish to conceal from the Council that while it will substantially improve the security of the observers, some risk will continue to exist.

39. In their démarches of May 1996 to President Shevardnadze and Mr. Ardzinba (see para. 6 above), the representatives of the group of "Friends of Georgia" in Tbilisi conveyed their respective Governments' concerns at the deterioration of security conditions in the Gali region and demanded that the parties take steps to prevent mine-laying.

40. As already reported (see para. 11 above), the Council of Heads of State of CIS adopted on 17 May 1996 a decision on the presence of the CIS peace-keeping force in the conflict zone in Abkhazia, Georgia (see S/1996/371, annex I). By that decision, the Council decided that, with the consent of the parties, the "demarcation of minefields and mine clearance in the territory of Abkhazia, Georgia, with the assistance of the United Nations and in cooperation of the local authorities" should be added to the mandate of the CIS peace-keeping force. In discussions with relevant authorities in Moscow, the Head of Mission has ascertained that the phrase "assistance of the United Nations" should be understood to refer to the financial assistance of the United Nations. The Council furthermore decided to instruct "the parties to the conflict, with the assistance of the [CIS peace-keeping force] in the conflict zone in Abkhazia, Georgia, to take additional measures to ensure the safety of the personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia in the performance of their duties". The Head of Mission has been informed that the "conflict zone" relates only to the security zone in the UNOMIG area of responsibility.

VI. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

41. Cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force continues to be satisfactory. In particular, the use of a CIS peace-keeping force helicopter to evacuate casualties among the local population has been invaluable, as has the fact that the force's doctors have provided medical assistance to such casualties at the military hospital in Sukhumi. The two have patrolled jointly when the situation on the ground permitted.

42. The Georgian Parliament, in its resolution of 17 April mentioned in para. 9 above, criticized the CIS peace-keeping force for having failed so far to ensure "the safe and unconditional return of forcibly displaced persons and refugees" and stated that if the force's "current mandate [was] retained and Georgia's proposals for a new mandate [see S/1996/5, para. 4] [were] ignored, the peace-keeping operation should be considered unviable" and "be withdrawn from the territory of Georgia within two months".

43. The Abkhaz leader, Mr. Ardzinba, spoke in favour of the force's continued presence in the conflict zone and expressed the opinion that any changes in the force's mandate or its eventual withdrawal could be decided only with the consent of the two parties.

44. As regards the mandate, the Council of Heads of State of CIS, in its decision of 17 May (see para. 11 above), instructed the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Council of Ministers of Defence of the CIS to pursue their efforts, together with the representatives of the parties, "to amplify the mandate of the Collective Peace-keeping Forces in accordance with the decision of 19 January 1996 of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth" and extended the presence of the CIS force until 19 July 1996.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

45. By its resolution 50/237 of 7 June 1996, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $17,089,600 gross for UNOMIG for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission.

46. I shall submit, as soon as possible, an addendum to the present report stating the financial implications of including in the UNOMIG budget the small programme for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia referred to in paragraph 17 above. The addendum will also set out the financial implications of the arrangements being made to deal with the mine threat mentioned in paragraph 38.

47. The cost of maintaining the Mission will be limited to the amount appropriated by the General Assembly should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMIG beyond 12 July 1996, as recommended in paragraph 57 below.

48. As at 26 June 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIG Special Account amounted to $1.7 million, and total unpaid assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations amounted to $1.7 billion.

VIII. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

49. In the social and economic areas, the challenge for the Government of Georgia, the donor community, international agencies and non-governmental organizations, during this period of economic and social transition in Georgia, is to find a healthy balance between addressing the immediate needs of the population and supporting long-term rehabilitation and development plans.

50. Recent progress in political and economic stabilization has given rise to an increase in technical and development-oriented assistance, and led to a decrease in emergency relief and humanitarian aid. The Government, conscious of the discontinuation of certain humanitarian support, appealed for assistance in the revitalization and restructuring of the major economic sectors. The Bretton Woods institutions and other organizations within the United Nations system have agreed to support programmes aimed at sustainable human development, as has the European Union. The Government ensures proper coordination of donor activities in Georgia, thus enabling multilateral and bilateral donors to deliver assistance in a concerted manner.

51. The United Nations operational activities for development are being coordinated by the United Nations Resident Coordinator. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is providing the Government with advice on policy and financial assistance for capacity-building in the economic and social sectors.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

52. As indicated above, the political process remains at a standstill. The core issue in the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, namely the definition of a political status for Abkhazia acceptable to both sides, remains unresolved. I nevertheless am still convinced that negotiations between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities continue to be the only means of eventually settling the issue and thus solving the humanitarian problems of the refugees and displaced persons. This view is shared by the leaders of the Russian Federation, whom I met during my recent visit to Moscow.

53. My Special Envoy and his resident Deputy remain ready to carry forward their efforts along the lines described in my previous report (S/1996/284, paras. 47 and 48), with the help of the Russian Federation as facilitator and with the active participation of OSCE. In addition, I repeat my offer to meet either separately or jointly with the leaders of the two sides if this will advance the peace process.

54. My Special Envoy and his resident Deputy plan to meet officials of the Russian Federation in Moscow in the second half of July. At that meeting, they will review the situation, in particular the Russian-led efforts regarding the

draft protocol, and consider ways of moving the peace process forward. The resident Deputy will intensify his discussions with both sides in the hope that it will then become possible for my Special Envoy to convene discussions with them.

55. The mine threat in the Gali sector is serious and is not confined to a limited area. Not only is it preventing UNOMIG from implementing its mandate fully, but it could also have grave humanitarian consequences when the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons finally resumes. Although arrangements are being made to improve the observers' security so that patrolling can be resumed, this will not prevent the laying of new mines. I therefore appeal urgently to all concerned to put an end to a practice that jeopardizes the lives of the local population and of international civilian and military personnel and prevents the Mission from carrying out its mandate to the full.

56. As I have said repeatedly in previous reports, it is only the parties that can establish peace, and they must do it through dialogue and mutual accommodation. The current lack of progress calls into question how serious they are in their search for peace. Nor are additional measures by the United Nations to improve conditions in the security and restricted weapons zones likely to prove effective unless the parties demonstrate the necessary will to cooperate. It must also be pointed out that the financial situation of the Organization is such that I cannot continue to request resources for peacemaking and peace-keeping in situations where there is little prospect of making progress.

57. In the hope that the parties can still be persuaded to help reactivate the peace process, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNOMIG until 31 January 1997. Since, however, the mandate of the CIS peace-keeping force will expire on 19 July 1996, the extension of the mandate of UNOMIG should be subject to an early review by the Council, if decisions are taken to change the mandate of that force. I shall, of course, keep the Security Council informed of developments in this regard.

58. In conclusion, I should like to take this opportunity to thank my Special Envoy, Ambassador Edouard Brunner, his Deputy and the Head of Mission of UNOMIG, Mr. Liviu Bota, and the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Per Källström, as well as all the military and civilian personnel under their command, for their continued dedication and perseverance in carrying out, under difficult conditions, the tasks entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Annex

Composition of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia at 24 June 1996

Country	Military Observers
Albania	1
Austria	4
Bangladesh	11
Cuba	4
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Egypt	5
France	5
Germany	9
Greece	3
Hungary	7
Indonesia	6
Jordan	8
Pakistan	8
Poland	5
Republic of Korea	6
Russian Federation	3
Sweden	5 + (1)
Switzerland	5
Turkey	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10
United States of America	2
Uruguay	2
Total	125 a/

a/ The deployment of military observers may vary owing to rotations.



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